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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the early literature on market allocations between safe 
and risky investments suggested that the market would system- 
atically allocate too few resources to risky investments, particularly 
because many private risks are not social risks. More recently, how- 
ever, it has been argued that the stock market provides essentially 
all the risk-pooling possibilities that could be provided, "that the 
stock market constitutes an allocative mechanism of remarkable 
efficiency." 1 This has been established more precisely by Arrow and 
Debreu,2 provided that one assumes that there is a complete set of 
contingent commodities (i.e., in the stock market, at least as many 
securities as states of nature). There are, however, strong theoretical 
and empirical grounds on which to object to that assumption.3 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Far Eastern Meet- 
ings of the Econometric Society, Tokyo, 1970. Research support was pro- 
vided by the Guggenheim, Ford, and National Science foundations. The author 
is indebted to A. Klevorick, S. Koizumi, P. Kamiya, and M. Jensen for their 
comments on an earlier draft. M. Jensen and J. Long have reported results 
similar to those presented here in "On the Inconsistency between 'Optimal' 
Corporate Investment and Pareto Optimality," mimeo, University of Rochester, 
1969. 
1. W. J. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1965). 
2. K. J. Arrow, "The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk 
Bearing," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 31 (April 1964), pp. 91-96, and G. 
Debreu, The Theory of Value (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959). 
3. For a fuller discussion of them, the reader is referred to J. E. Stiglitz, 
"Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance, Bankruptcy, and 
Take-Overs," paper presented at Hakone (Japan), June 1970; J. E. Meade, 
The Theory of Indicative Planning (Manchester University Press, 1970); R. 
Radner, "Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty," Econometrica, vol. 36 (Jan. 1968), pp. 31-58; K. J. Arrow, Lecture 3, Some Aspects of the Theory of 
Risk-Bearing (Helsinki: Yrj6 Johnssonin SRati6, 1965); F. H. Hahn, "Equi- 
librium with Transactions Costs," Econometrica, vol. 39 (May 1971), pp. 417- 
440. 
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When there are fewer securities than states of nature,4 three prob- 
lems immediately arise: 
1. How are we to evaluate alternative allocations? In the ab- 
sence of a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption in different states by different in- 
dividuals will not in general be equal. Thus, it is not particularly 
meaningful to compare economies with a full set of Arrow-Debreu 
markets (which will be Pareto optimal in the conventional sense) 
with economies lacking such markets.5 We propose the following 
criterion: An allocation will be said to be a (constrained) Pareto- 
optimal allocation if a centralized planner, who was constrained to 
purchase factors and sell commodities through the given market 
structures, could not make anyone better off without making some- 
one worse off.6 
2. What is the objective of each firm? Conventional theory has 
the firm maximizing its stock market value; prices of the commodi- 
ties that an individual buys are unaffected by the action of the firm, 
so by increasing the wealth of the stockholder, the welfare of each 
stockholder is maximized. This is true whether the individual is a 
small or a large shareholder in the company. In the absence of a 
full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, there is no such presumption for 
value maximization. 
3. In order for the individual to evaluate alternative production 
plans, he must be able to ascertain their effect on the price of a share 
(on the value of the firm). In the Arrow-Debreu model, there are 
prices for outputs (inputs) in each state of nature, and the net value 
of the firm is simply the difference between the value of outputs and 
inputs using these prices.7 But how is the firm to evaluate alterna- 
4. The problems discussed here may arise even when there is no uncer- 
tainty, e.g., when only a few of the continuum of "qualities" of various 
commodities that might be produced actually are produced. The analysis of 
markets for risky assets provides a context in which these questions may be ana- 
lyzed with somewhat greater clarity and precision than in the more general 
case. Moreover, it will be clear from the discussion below that the existence 
of fewer securities than states of nature is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
all the difficulties that are about to be discussed to occur. 
5. As Borch has done; see, e.g., his "The Economics of Uncertainty" 
in M. Shubik, ed., Essays in Mathematical Economics, In Honor of Oskar 
Morgenstern (Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 197-210. 
6. This is equivalent to P. Diamond's concept of a "Constrained Pareto 
Optimal"; i.e., the income delivered to any individual is constrained to be 
a linear function of the outputs of the different firms in the economy. See P. 
Diamond, "The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model 
with Technological Uncertainty," American Economic Review, vol. 57 (Sept. 
1967), pp. 759-76. 
7. It should be clear that if there are as many independent securities as 
states of nature, it is equivalent to having a complete set of Arrow-Debreu 
markets. See D. Cass and J. E. Stiglitz, "The Structure of Preferences- and 
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tive production plans if there is not a complete set of Arrow-Debreu 
markets? 
This paper is primarily concerned with the third problem.8 
We shall present a specific example in which there is available a 
simple and plausible method of evaluation of alternative produc- 
tion plans, in which firms act like competitive price takers, but 
which, when firms maximize their stock market value, does not lead 
to an optimal allocation (in the sense defined above). More gen- 
erally, we shall use our example to give us some insights into why 
the market allocation resulting from value-maximizing firms is not 
likely to be optimal. 
II. THE BASIC MODEL 
Before investigating in detail our specific example, we shall 
outline the basic structure of our economy. Our economy consists 
of n+1 firms (industries)9 and mn individuals. We shall consider a 
simple two-period model, in which a single factor input, denoted by I 
(for investment), is taken in the first period and transformed into a 
single commodity output the second.' Firms (industries) will differ 
from one another in the pattern of returns across the states of nature, 
not in the commodities that they produce. 
A. Individual Behavior 
Each individual begins "life" with a given endowment of the 
factor, Ii, and a given set of ownership claims on the various firms. 
Returns and Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure 
Theory of Mutual Funds," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 2 (June 1970), 
Appendix A, pp. 122-60. 
8. The second problem, that of the objective function of the firm, is dis- 
cussed in J. E. Stiglitz, "Value Maximization and Alternative Objectives of 
the Firm," mimeo, Cowles Foundation, 1972, and J. E. Stiglitz, "Some Aspects 
of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance," op. cit. 
9. For most of the analysis, we shall assume that n is fixed. In Section V, 
we shall consider briefly what happens when n is also determined endogenously. 
This is discussed at greater length in J. E. Stiglitz, "The Degree of Product 
Differentiation in Monopolistic Competition: An Example" (forthcoming). 
1. At the cost of a slight increase in notational complexity, the model 
may be easily extended to the case where there is a vector of inputs. The 
case where there are several outputs introduces an element of price uncertainty. 
The uncertainty associated with relative prices, though undoubtedly of great 
importance, introduces additional problems to be discussed elsewhere. See 
J. E. Stiglitz, "Behavior Towards Risk with Many Commodities," Econome- 
trica, vol. 37 (Oct. 1969), pp. 660-66; J. E. Stiglitz, "A Consumption Oriented 
Theory of the Demand for Financial Assets and the Term Structure of Inter- 
est Rates," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 37 (July 1970), pp. 321-51; and 
the introductory remarks in P. Diamond, op. cit. 
2. Because of the one-commodity assumption, the only source of un- 
certainty is technological. See note 1 preceding. 
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/3,) is the proportion of the shares of the ith firm owned by the jth 
individual 3 at the beginning of the first period (E .,8i==l). If the 
firm were to do no investment in the first period, the individual 
would receive f3ij of the output of the firm in the second period. The 
individual can, of course, sell his ownership claims in the ith firm to 
purchase shares in some other firm, and in general we would expect 
that he will rearrange his "portfolio." Moreover, the value of the 
individual's initial ownership claims in the ith firm will depend on 
the level of investment it undertakes. If the ith firm invests I, and 
the total market value of the firm is Vi,4 then the value of the equity 
of the initial shareholders is Vi-Ii, the total value of the firm less 
the capital raised to finance the new investment.5 The Modigliani- 
Miller theorem assures that the value of the firm is independent of 
how it finances its new investment; i.e., it does not depend on the 
debt-equity ratio of the firm.6 Hence the total initial wealth of the 
jth individual Woj is just 
(1) We i = inivi+ lokj (VaI t vi 
The individual looks at the various securities that are available 
3. Here and elsewhere, we use superscripts j to denote individuals and 
subscripts i to denote firms. (Later, when there is no ambiguity, we shall drop 
the superscripts and subscripts.) 
4. Our "numeraire" is I. All economic activity (trading and investment 
decisions) in this model occurs in the first period; hence, we are only concerned 
with the determination of the value of the firms at that time. Extending the 
analysis to a multiperiod (in particular, to an infinite time) horizon involves 
several essential difficulties, including the fact that the value of the firm today 
depends on its expected value tomorrow, which depends, in turn, on its ex- 
pected value the day after, and so on; in a deterministic context, these prob- 
lems have been discussed in K. Shell and J. E. Stiglitz, "The Allocation of In- 
vestment in Dynamic Economy," this Journal, vol. 81 (Nov. 1967), pp. 592-609. 
5. It may be useful to think of the different firms as different farms opera- 
ting on indivisible pieces of land. Then ownership claims are on particular 
pieces of land. The total value of the farm, V+, is equal to the value of the 
land plus the value of the investment on the farm, It. 
6. F. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review, vol. 48 
(June 1958), pp. 261-97, and J. E. Stiglitz, "A Re-Examination of the Modi- 
gliani-Miller Theorem," American Economic Review, vol. 59 (Dec. 1969), pp. 
784-93. Throughout, we make the assumption of no transactions costs and no 
differential tax treatment of different financial instruments. These are, of 
course, crucial assumptions. See, e.g., J. E. Stiglitz, "Taxation, Risk-Taking, 
and the Allocation of Investment in a Competitive Economy," in M. Jensen, 
ed., Studies in, the Theory of Capital Markets (forthcoming). 
7. We are explicitly assuming that there are no other assets (and no other 
sources of income) besides those provided by our n+1 firms. The analysis 
may be extended to these cases, provided, of course, that it still remains true -- 
as seems to be the case -that there are fewer securities than states of nature. 
(As long as marginal rates of substitution of income in one state of nature for 
that in another remain different for different individuals, there is an incentive 
to create additional assets. But there are numerous reasons why this does not 
occur. See note 3, page 25 above.) 
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and allocates his wealth among them so as to maximize his expected 
utility next period; that is, if ei(6) is the return per dollar invested 
in the ith risky firm's stock, and r is the return on a safe security 
(bond), i.e., a security that pays the same amount in every state of 
nature, and if the individual purchases Vii dollars of the ith firm's 
shares,8 his income in state 0, YJ(O) is 
n n (2) Yj (f9) Vqaej(0) +r (Woj- EV/). i=1 
~ 
He chooses Vqj to 
(3) maximize Eu(PY(0)) 
where, as usual, we assume the individual is risk averse (u'>0, 
u"<O). Thus, the individual's demand for the ith security will be 
a function of e1, . . ., en, r, and Woj: 
(4) Vqj= Di(ei, . . . , en, r, Woi) j 
(4) differs from the conventional demand functions in that, in- 
stead of writing demand as a function of the price of the ith firm's 
securities, it is written as a function of the returns per dollar in the 
ith security. We can, however, rewrite (4) into a slightly more "con- 
ventional" form. Because of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, we can, 
without loss of generality, assume that the firm issues only shares, 
so that the total value of equities is equal to the total value of the 
firm. Thus, the return per dollar invested in the jth firm is just 
equal to the total returns to the ith firm divided by the total value of 
its equities. 
(5) ej (0) = Xi (0) /Vi, r= Xs/Vs 
where Xi(0) is the total return to the ith firm in state 0. The sub- 
script s denotes the riskless industry.9 Substituting (5) into (4), we 
obtain 
(5') Vi = D~i* (Vin . Vn) Vs; Xi) . Xn) XS) Woj) . 
Finally, summing over all individuals, we obtain the market 
"demand" functions 
(6) V$d=-V. = YD.i*= 
D * (Vi) . . . , Vn) V,; Xi, .. Xn, Xs; W0l) . Om) . 
8. We allow short sales and borrowing, i.e., 
V450f W01- I Vtii:O. 
i=1 
9. Throughout this paper we assume the existence of a perfectly safe firm. 
The analysis may easily be modified if there is no such firm, provided that 
there exists a safe security (bonds with no default risk); the market alloca- 
tion will still be nonoptimal. We make the assumption of the existence of a 
safe industry because one of the questions on which we wish to focus is 
whether there is a systematic misallocation of resources to the safe industry 
relative to the risky. 
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We have thus characterized the "demand" side of the market. 
We now turn to a more detailed description of the firms. 
B. Firm Behavior 
Each firm is characterized by a production technology, which 
specifies the output in state 9, if the firm invests Ih and chooses pro- 
duction plan ej: 
(7) Xi (0) =Xi (0, It ei). 
Alternative production plans, for instance, for a farm, might be 
whether to use a fertilizer, which will increase output (for given level 
of input) in those states of nature when it rains, but decreases it in 
a drought. 
The firm chooses a level of investment and its production plan 
in order to maximize the stock market value of its initial share- 
holders, V-Ij.1 The difficulty is to determine what will be the effects 
on the stock market valuation of a risky firm of a change in its 
investment level or production plan. We shall call the relationship 
between the market value perceived by the firm and the level of in- 
vestment and production plan its valuation function. If there were 
a complete set of Arrow-Debreu prices -so that q (0) is the price 
today of a promise to deliver one dollar next period if state 6 
occurs -the calculation of Vj would be straightforward: 
(8) V, = E4 Xi (0) q (0) . 
0 
If there were not a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets, but there 
were as many independent firms as states of nature, then the firm 
could infer the market evaluation of income in each state of nature; 
that is, if the firm knew the market valuation of v other firms (where 
v is the number of states of nature) and their outputs in each state 
of nature, then it could solve for that set of q(0) which would make 
v 
V, = Y. q (0) Xi (0) i=1 v , tn, 
0=1 
i.e., in vector notation 2 
(9) q(O) =V.X-1. 
1. As we noted in the introduction, it is not obvious that, when there are 
fewer securities than states of nature, value maximization is in the interests 
of the shareholders. Our motivation in using that assumption here is to make 
the results of our model as comparable as possible to those of the conventional 
Arrow-Debreu model; and because it is a behavioral rule that has often been 
suggested firms ought to use, we believe it is worthwhile pursuing its implica- 
tions. See, e.g., I. Fisher, The Theory of Interest (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1930); M. Jensen and J. Long, op. cit.; F. Modigliani and M. Miller, op. cit.; 
and J. E. Stiglitz, "Value Maximization," op. cit. 
2. The assumption of "independent firms" assures us that X-1 exists. For 
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Notice that in this case the firm has to have knowledge about both 
the outputs of other firms in each state and their market valuations. 
But, as we noted in the introduction, not only is there no com- 
plete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, there are fewer firms than 
states of nature. 
In the example to be analyzed in detail below, there is, however, 
another natural valuation function. For the moment, our concern 
is understanding the basic structure of the model. For this, all we 
need is to postulate some valuation function of the firm that leads 
to a determinate level of investment, Ih, as a function of the out- 
puts and market valuations of the other firms, or some market- 
determined parameters (such as q(0) in the Arrow-Debreu model).3 
C. Market Equilibrium 
Finally, we come to a statement of the conditions for equilibrium 
of our economy. An equilibrium is described by a set of firm valu- 
ations, Vi, investment levels, I1, and choices of plans, A, such that 
given the levels of investment, firm valuations, and choices of plans 
of all of the other firms, each firm believes that it is maximizing the 
stock market value of its initial shareholders; such that 
(10) E I=E I' 
the sum of investment demands is equal to the total factor supply; 
and such that the demands for the different securities (taking the 
return per dollar of the firm in each state of nature as given) add up 
to the supply of securities, 
(11 V= V~dEm V~j. 
To recapitulate: we are concerned with the determination of the 
equilibrium in the n+2 markets in the first period -the n+1 
markets for securities and the market for the factor. In the second 
period there is no economic activity; individuals simply receive and 
consume the commodities that they have "contracted" for by their 
purchases of various securities. At the beginning of the first period, 
individuals have claims on the various firms and given supplies of 
the factor. These they trade among themselves. Firms purchase 
a more extended discussion of the relation between market securities and 
Arrow-Debreu securities, see D. Cass and J. E. Stiglitz, "The Structure of Pref- 
erences and Returns and Separability in Portfolio Allocation," op. cit., and D. 
Cass and J. E. Stiglitz, "Risk Aversion and Wealth Effects on Portfolios with 
Many Assets," Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming). 
3. We need to impose one further condition on the firm evaluation func- 
tion: in equilibrium, the price that the firm "predicts" for itself at the level of 
investment and for the production plan it undertakes must be the value 
actually obtained. 
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these factors, in return giving claims on their output next period. 
The levels of investment and choices of production plans are made 
to maximize the value of the original shareholders' equity, where 
the valuation is determined by some (as yet unspecified) valuation 
function. Equilibrium requires that investment by firms equal the 
supply of I by individuals (equilibrium in the factor market) and 
"exchange equilibrium" - at the given market prices of the securi- 
ties no individual wishes to exchange his ownership claims on one 
firm for ownership claims on another. The timing and notation is 
set out in Table I. 
What remains to be done is a precise specification of the firm's 
valuation function. We do this in the context of a specific example 
that has played a central role in the development of the literature 
on uncertainty and portfolio analysis: the mean variance model. 
III. DETERMINATION OF THE LEVEL OF INVESTMENT IN A 
MEAN VARIANCE MODEL 
A. Individual Behavior 
We shall assume that the individual evaluates alternative pat- 
terns of income in terms of mean, EY, and variance uy2; if U (Y) is 
his utility function in terms of income, then 
(12) Eu(Y)=U(EY, uy) 
where 
(13) ay 2=E(Y--EY)2. 
The justifications and limitations of this assumption have been 
analyzed in detail elsewhere.4 In order to focus on the problem at 
hand, we shall assume that all individuals have correct (and hence 
identical) expectations about the output of each firm in each state 
of nature. Moreover, to facilitate comparisons between the market 
and optimal allocations, we shall assume that all individuals are 
identical.5 
When individuals' expected utility can be written as a function 
4. In particular, we require either that individuals have a quadratic utility 
function or that the joint probability distribution of all returns is a multi- 
variate normal distribution. For a discussion of the sufficiency of these con- 
ditions, see J. Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk," 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 25 (Feb. 1958), pp. 65-86, and "The Theory 
of Portfolio Selection," in Hahn and Brechling, eds., The Theory of Interest 
Rates (London: Macmillan, 1965) pp. 3-51. For a discussion of the necessity 
of these conditions, see M. Rothschild and J. E. Stiglitz, "Increasing Risk: A 
Definition," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 2 (Sept. 1970), pp. 225-43. 
5. This assumption may, however, be easily removed. Cf. P. Diamond, op. 
cit. 
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of the mean and standard deviation of income, it is well known that 
we can reduce the portfolio allocation problem to two separate 
problems: (a) finding the proportion of wealth to invest in the safe 
asset, and (b) finding the proportions in which to invest in the al- 
ternative risky assets.6 Indeed it can be shown 7 that all individuals, 
independent of their utility function, initial endowments, etc., will 




where ej (0) = return per dollar invested in jth risky asset in state 0, 
i-=i . . ., n. 
u4 = Eei=average return per dollar invested in ith risky 
asset. 
ay = E (ei- 4) (ej- j) = covariance of returns of ith and jth 
firms (per dollar invested in each). 
a= variance of ith security per dollar invested. 
or ij=cofactor of ijth element of the inverse of {oij}. 
= proportion of total assets invested in ith risky asset. 
r = return per dollar invested in safe bond (riskless firm). 
We shall denote by CR and uR the standard deviation and mean 
of the return per dollar invested in the optimal risky portfolio; let 
x*, equal the optimal proportion of risky assets held in the ith secur- 
ity. Then 
(16) Us ax Be; 
(17) O-B X tnijx j. 
The remaining portfolio allocation problem is what percentage, 
a, of one's wealth to allocate to the risky assets. We choose a to max- 
imize 
EU(Wo(auR+(1-a.)r), aoRWO) EU(EY, Uy). 
6. This is just the portfolio separation theorem, originally proved by 
Tobin, op. cit. For a complete discussion and generalization of this theorem, 
see D. Cass and J. E. Stiglitz, "The Structure of Preferences and Returns and 
Separability in Portfolio Allocation," op. cit. 
7. Let X=(X1, . . . , x,), a = (Al, . . . , A.) . Then E Y-Wo(r+x. r)) 
and ay=- XX'Wo2. An efficient portfolio must minimize variance for any given 
mean; forming the Lagrangian 
(13) L-=XX'Wo2+q'(M-(X - (.-r)or)Wo), 
we obtain the following necessary conditions: 
(14) Xoa=q(u-r) 
where q=q'/Wo, or 
(14E) io= q(1u-r)all. 
Equation (15) follows immediately. 
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Hence 
(18) - U2 /Ja- 
The marginal rate of substitution between mean and standard devia- 
tion must equal the "adjusted" coefficient of variation, taking the 
safe asset as the origin. The portfolio allocation is described in the 




Individual's Portfolio Allocation 
gives all possible mean standard deviations from investing only in 
the risky assets in different proportions, R gives the optimal risky 
portfolio, S denotes terminal wealth if all were invested in the safe 
asset, and SR gives the opportunity locus. E is the equilibrium. 
B. Equilibrium Market Valuations 
The great advantage of using the mean variance model is that, 
in equilibrium, the values of the different firms will be related to one 
another in a simple and intuitively plausible way: for each firm, we 
can calculate the certainty equivalent of its uncertain income; the 
market valuation is just the certainty equivalent return discounted 
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by the safe rate of return, r. The certainty equivalent of its income 
is just its mean return less a risk discount factor times the "riskiness" 
of the firm's income, where "riskiness" is simply the sum of its own 
variance plus its covariance with all other firms. Hence 8 
(19) Vi= EXi -k4E (Xi,-EX,) (Xj-EXj) 
r 
where k is the risk discount factor.9 It is important to observe that 
kc, like any other "price," is the same for all firms. 
This valuation formula has one important property to which 
attention should be drawn: observe that if we have two perfectly 
correlated firms, so zXi(0) =Xk(G), then Vk(0) =zVi(0), just as we 
would expect.' On the other hand, if Xi is not perfectly correlated 
with Xk and if Xk has z times the mean and standard deviation of 
Xi, and the two firms are equally correlated with the rest of the 
market, Vk will be less than z times Vi. This is a natural result from 
risk aversion and the consequent desire for diversification by indi- 
viduals. If the two firms were "identically distributed" (but not per- 
fectly correlated) and if the value were proportional to the size 
(so that mean and standard deviation of the return per dollar were 
the same), all individuals would want to hold the securities of the 
two firms in equal amounts; hence, if the demand for securities of 
8. This result was originally established by J. Lintner, "The Valuation of 
Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and 
Capital Budgets," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 47 (Feb. 1965), 
pp. 13-37, and W. F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equi- 
librium under Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance, vol. 19 (Sept. 1964), 
pp. 425-42. See also J. Mossin, "Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market," 
Econometrica, vol. 34 (Oct. 1966), pp. 768-83. 
This result follows by substituting --(5) into (14) to obtain, e.g., 
2EX,,' ( V-V)V-V- )-qS -r 
Multiplying by Vs, we obtain 
W1 l 
l l 'V (Xi-EX) (XM-EXk) =EX,-rVi. 





from which we can immediately derive (19). 
9. By summing (19) over all i, we obtain the result that 
2 EX,-rZVi k=- 
22E(X,-EX0)(Xj-EXj) 
1. VI = {EX,-k 2 E(Xi -EX) (Xi-EXj)?E(X -EX,)2(1+z)}/r }id, k 
Vk={zEX,-k( 2 z(E(Xs-EXs)(Xs-EXA) j3i, k 
+E(Xi -EX,)2(z2+z)}/r=zVI. 
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the smaller firm equaled the supply (i.e., equaled the value of the 
firm), demand would be less than supply for the larger. Hence, 
market clearing requires the larger firm to have a value that is less 
than proportional to its size; the mean and standard deviation of the 
return per dollar invested must be greater for the. larger firm than 
for the smaller to induce individuals to hold a larger proportion of 
their portfolio in that firm. 
The proportionality factor k will in general depend on the vec- 
tors P and /hj, the number and preferences of individuals in the 
economy, and the patterns of outputs of the different firms, Xj (0). 
But in two special cases, k takes on a very simple form: 
(a) If all individuals have a quadratic utility function, i.e., 
ui ( YJ) =-e- ajYji 
then 2 
(20) k= 1 
> .->-- EXj 
(b) If all individuals have constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., 
uj(YJ) =-e-a Y 
and if all xi are jointly normally distributed, so that Y' is normally 
distributed, with mean EY and variance 0,y2, then 
Uj (E Y, uy) = Eui -exp -aiE Y)+ aj2uy2/2}, 
from which it follows that 3 
2. This may be proved as follows: we can write 
YJ (0)- XJ (et-r)+r)Wo = Zyi (Xi -rV,)+rWoj 
where Y,=_XJW0,/V,= VJ/Vi-share of it" firm owned by jth individual (after 
allocating his portfolio optimally). Hence, optimal choice of XV (-yJ) implies 
aEU -E{(X4-rV,)-cJ(2(Xi-rV,)(Xk-rVk) yk+WoJr(Xi-rV,))}=O. 
Rewriting Xj-rVj=Xj-EXj+EXj-rVs, and summing over all j, we obtain 
(2(I roj)) .(EXA-rVi)=2 E(Xi-EXi)(Xk-EXk) 
+ (EXi-rVD2(EXk-rVk). 
Upon observing that 2Vk- WoJ we obtain 
? in Eu = -a (EX,-rV0) -aj2ZE(Xi-EX,) (Xk-EXk)-ykI =0. 
3. This follows by taking 
1 (EX,-rV0)(2I jf-YEXk)=- E(X,-EX0)(Xk-EXk). CI 
Summing over i, we obtain 
(2 1 (EX, -Wid) = E(Xi EXs) (Xb - Xk). 
The reason that k takes on such a simple form here is that the demand 
for risky assets does not in this special example depend on the level of wealth. 
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(20') k =1/E~ (1l/a0). 
Notice that in both cases the variance of the available securities 
does not affect the size of k; however, increasing the number of 
individuals among whom the risks are spread does reduce k.4 
For later reference, it will be useful to express k in terms of 
the marginal rate of substitution of individuals between mean and 
standard deviation. Since all individuals hold the risky assets in 
the same proportions, we can aggregate all the risky firms together. 
Let VR be the value of the aggregate risky portfolio, 
n 
VR = > V,, XR=: Xi, fiJb=EXR/VR, CR2 
j=1 i 





EX+ (U2/U1) (E (XR.- EXR) 2) 1/2 (21) VP.= 
r 
Comparing (19) and (21), we immediately observe that 
(22) k= U2 
U1 (E (XR-EXR) 2) 1/2 
k equals the marginal rate of substitution of mean for standard de- 
viation divided by the standard deviation of the risky assets; equiv- 
alently, it is twice the marginal rate of substitution of mean for 
variance.5 
C. Firm Behavior 
In the previous subsection, we derived the relative valuations 
of different firms, given Xi(O) (i.e., given their investment level and 
choice of production plan). We now turn to the crucial question of 
the determination of the firm's decisions. We begin our analysis 
See Cass-Stiglits, "The Structure of Preferences and Returns and Separabil- 
ity," op. cit. 
4. A similar observation (in a different context) was made by P. A. 
Samuelson, "Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers," Scientia 
(April-May 1963), 6th Series, 57th year, pp. 1-6. 
5. It should be clear that, although we originally expressed our utility 
function in terms of mean and standard deviation, it was an arbitrary choice 
based primarily on considerations of analytical convenience; we could as easily 
have written 
Eu=v(EY, uT2) 
and conducted our analysis in terms of v rather than 1A. 
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with the special case where the firm's only decision is I. We shall, 
moreover, assume that all firms are independent, i.e., 
(23) E (xi -EXIT) (Xj -EXj) = O. i f j. 
Thus if aXi2=E(Xi- EXI )2, the value of the firm in equilibrium 
will depend only on EXj and axi, and the market parameters r and 
EXi-kX12 (24) VI= 
r 
To describe the technology of the ith firm, we need only to specify 
how the mean and variance depend on the investment level: 
(25a) EXj (I1 ) = hi (Is ) 
(25b) vax (Is = 9i (Is - 
Increasing investment leads to increased average returns, but at a 
declining rate, 
(26a) h$}> O. h~qO 
while standard deviation is an increasing convex function of It, 
(26b) go s O. ~ 9q> 
(All that we really require is that g" g,+g',2>0. For the safe in- 
dustry, g==-O.) 
The firm chooses its investment level to maximize the stock 
market value of its initial shareholders, i.e., if VI(I) is the value 




(27) dV 1 
dI, 1 
For the safe industry, this implies that if it acts competitively 
and takes the rate of interest as given, so that 
Vs = h8 (Is) /r, 
then 
(28a) h' (Is) = r. 
The rate of return on a safe investment is just equal to the marginal 
productivity of investment in the safe industry. This is as it should 
be. 
For the risky firms, the calculation of the consequences of al- 
ternative investment levels is only slightly more complicated. The 
firm calculates the certainty equivalent of its random output at 
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The certainty equivalent is just the mean minus a "risk premium," 
where the "risk premium" is just the variance times a "risk discount 
factor." In other words, we can think of firms as selling two com- 
modities, mean and variance, which have "prices" 1/r and -k/r, 
respectively (i.e., an increase in the variance reduces the value of the 
firm). If firms take these prices (k and r) as given, maximization 
of stock market valuations implies (from (24) and (27)) 
(28b) h'i(IJ) -2kg' (I) gi 1 
r. 
Because of assumptions (26), (28) can be inverted: 
(29) Ii==IA(k, r) 
with 
(30a) -h = 2gigi <0 
and 
(30b) Dr - h*i -k(g"qg,+g',2) 0. 
D. Market Equilibrium 
The total competitive market equilibrium for the mean variance 
model may now be easily described. (28) defines the level of in- 
vestment for each value of r and k. For each value of r and k that 
clears the investment market, i.e., 
(10') Id(r, k) E Ii(r, k)=E 4j 
(19) defines a value of r and k that will clear the securities market. 
A value of r and k and the associated values of Iq and V? simultane- 
ously satisfying (10') and (19) is a competitive equilibrium. 
The market equilibrium may be depicted graphically for the 
case where all m consumers are identical and all the firms in the 
risky industry are identical (but independently distributed). Clearly, 
the level of investment in each of the risky firms will be identical. 
First, we describe the mean variance opportunity locus. If IR 
is the total amount invested in the risky industries, the mean and 
variance of output second period per capita are given by 
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(31a) EY= {h8 (I-IR) + hR (IR) }/rn 
XR2 (IR) n' (31b) a m2 m- (JRs 
where 
hR (IR) -nh, (IR/n). 
Under the assumptions about our technology given in (26), in the 
relevant region, where increasing the allocation to the risky in- 
dustries increases mean as well as variance, i.e., 
(32) dEY h'R-h'8 >0 
daym g R 





Market and Optimal Allocation of Investment 
By increasing r and decreasing k, we can generate all points on 
the opportunity locus (using (10') and (30)). We can then calculate 
what the slope of the indifference curve through the given point 
would have to be to induce individuals to hold the given securities 
in the amount supplied. Using (22), we have 
(33) -_U 
-_kg__ UR) 




-2kgR (IR); daym 
so the slope of the opportunity locus is always twice as great as the 
d2EY (h"R+h"s dEY g) m 
day' 9IR day g'R gtR 
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slope of the indifference curve that would sustain the given point on 
the opportunity locus. Point C denotes a competitive equilibrium 
for our example. 
There is nothing that we have said so far that ensures an interior 
equilibrium; i.e., it is possible to have a market equilibrium with 
only safe or risky industries, as depicted in Figures Ila and b. 











Specialization in Safe Industry 
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It is easy to calculate the solution explicitly for the two cases 
of quadratic and constant absolute risk aversion presented above. 
In the latter case, (20') states that market equilibrium requires k 
l/: (l/aj)) k*. Thus, we simply find that value of r for which 
(35) Id (r, k* ) =Il. 
If 
(36a) 1(0, kl)=oo, 
(36b) I(oo, k) =O 
we can always find a unique value of 0 <r < so satisfying (35).7 If 
h's (0) > r* > h'8 (I), then the equilibrium is interior. 
Similarly, for the quadratic utility function, k must satisfy 
(20). To "solve" diagrammatically for the equilibrium values of 
r and k, observe that the investment market-clearing equation de- 
fines a negatively sloped curve between r and k, which (under 
assumption (36b)) hits the horizontal axis at a finite value of 
r rmax, beyond which, even at a zero price of risk, demand for in- 
vestment falls short of supply; and as r gets smaller, the curve ap- 
proaches (under assumption (36a)) the vertical line rmin, below 
which, even at an infinite price of risk, there is excess demand for 
investment goods (see Figure IV). Along the investment goods 
k 
| : \investment goods equilibrium curve 




Determination of Equilibrium (k, r) for 
Quadratic Utility Function 
7. This will clearly be satisfied if for any i, lim h'J(I0)-> and for all Ii .+O 
I, lim hCo(Ij)>0. 
Ij - 0 
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equilibrium curve, it can be shown that 1EXj is an increasing func- 
tion of r, from which it follows that along (14), k is an increasing 
function of r.8 Clearly, the two curves must intersect once and only 
once. 
E. Pareto Optimality 
We now wish to compare the market equilibrium described in 
the previous subsection with the optimal allocation. We wish to 
maximize U(EY, ay), where ay is defined in (31). Optimality re- 
quires 
_ U2gg U 1 dg.2 (37a) h'j-h'8 u2 gig -- U1 2qR dlh 
The differences between the marginal increase in average re- 
turns of the ith asset and the safe asset should be proportional to 
the marginal increase in variance, with the proportionality factor 
being the marginal rate of substitution divided by twice the stan- 
dard deviation of the risky assets. This should be contrasted with 
the market equilibrium, which may be written, using (22) and 
(28), as 
U2 2g'?gj U2 1 dg.2 (37b) h-h'=- --- d- . 
U1 IR U? 9R dI, 
The equations are identical, except that the proportionality factor 
is twice that of the optimal allocation, i.e., the "price" of risk is 
twice what it should be. 
The resulting effect on the resource allocation may be seen 
diagrammatically as follows. 
Assume that all the risky firms are identical. Recall from the 
previous subsection that the opportunity locus is concave. Then the 
optimal point P is simply the tangency of the indifference curve with 
the opportunity locus (Figure II). It is clear from a comparison of 
P and C that P always lies to the right of C: the market allocation 
always results in less investment in the risky industries than the 
optimal allocation. 
8. Along the locus defined by (10), we require 
dI ?sh dk Z'h 
dr r +dr 2k 
But from (30) 
dk (h'4-r) 
1+- dI dr k 
dr h"4-k(g"stg+g%2) 
By (26) the denominators are all negative while the numerator is a monotonic 
function of h', so that for those firms with large h', dildr>0, and conversely 
for firms for small h'. But dEXt/dr= zh'4 d14/dr and the result is immediate. 
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More generally, it is possible to show that, although the market 
allocation always lies along the social opportunity locus,9 i.e., is 
"efficient," it always results in too much investment in the safe 
industry. 
F. Nonindependent Returns 
When, however, we drop the assumption of independence, the 
economy will not even be "efficient," i.e., it will operate "below" 
its mean variance opportunity locus. To see this, assume that the 
returns to any firm may be described by 






(38c) EE j = O, EciM(0) = O 
(38d) EM(0) 2 - 1, .s2 = 1 (38d) (O =,Ec2-
so 
(38e) E (Xi-EX .) 2 - 9 
M(f) is a market factor common to all firms (the state of the busi- 
ness cycle). (38) states that the residual variance after taking out 
the common market factor is independent across firms. 
Then the market valuation for the ith firm is (substituting (38) 
into (19) ) 
htk(g,2+M,2+M, j 
(39) V>= itj 
r 
There are three factors in the determination of the value of a firm: 
the mean, the variance, and the correlation with the "business cycle" 
of the returns of the firm. 
If the firm maximizes the value of the original shareholders' 
equities, taking the interest rate, the risk discount factor, and the 
investment of the other firms as given (so that X mj, the "magnitude 
il-j 
9. Efficiency requires 
min Mgt' 
subject to Zhl = constant 
i.e., 
where v is a proportionality factor. But the market investment equations (28) 
are of the same parametric form, and hence the market allocation is efficient. 
1. The conditions given in (38d) are simply normalizations. 
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of the cyclical fluctuations," due to the other firms, is given), then 
(40) ha-_r=k(2gjg',+2m#m',+m', v. mj). 
is~j 
The mean variance efficiency frontier is, on the other hand, defined 
parametrically by 2 
(41) h'j-r=K (gjg'a+mim '+Mm'i X mj). 
ifj 
A comparison of (40) and (41) immediately yields the result 
that the market allocation places twice as much weight on the own 
variance relative to the covariance terms as it "ought to," i.e., as it 
would along the efficiency frontier; indeed, it should be clear that 
optimality requires that the firm pay no more attention to its own 
variance than to the covariance terms -in equilibrium all the 
securities are "lumped" together in one mutual fund. (41) con- 
firms this. 
The reason for this misallocation is that the covariance of the 
firms with one another acts very much like an externality. A change 
in the level of investment of one firm affects the value of all other 
firms; although it may affect the value of any individual firm very 
little, when added up over all the firms, the effect is nonnegligible. 
The implications of this for the direction of the misallocation of 
investment are clear. Assume for instance that there are two risky 
industries. For simplicity, let h = h'jI, m, = m'j, gt = g'ih, with h'W, 
m',, g', constants. Assume that the two industries have the same 
mean returns. Then, letting (r! -mt'2+g/2 variance per dollar in- 
vested, 
{ I, 8 { I, j mtx(at /2_ .02) (42) (h) - , = 
Ii M I o (2or '2- m'm) (oXj'2 - rrn') 
where (I/Ij)M and (IhI)o are the market and optimal ratios of in- 
vestment in industry i to that in j. Thus, if mr.m> 0, i.e., the two are 
positively correlated, the market allocates relatively too little to the 
low variance industry (provided mr' < M!+ g.'2/Mr' or m'> mrn+ 
2g '2/Mr'). Other cases are left to the reader. 
(40) and (41) have one interesting and important implication: 
observe that if the own variance term is small relative to the covari- 
2. We wish to 
max 2hd1()?h8(1-HI ) 
subject to Xg12+22mim, = C2. 
Forming the Lagrangian 
L = ~h~?h g,2 u2) L=Mht+ ,,-2 (s+22:mfmi- 2 
and taking the derivative with respect to I,, we obtain (41). 
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ance terms, the level of investment yielded by (40) will be approxi- 
mately that yielded by (41); indeed, not only are we "approxi- 
mately" efficient, but we are "approximately" Pareto optimal.3 
IV. CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE 
In the preceding section, we considered the market allocation 
of investment, assuming that the firm had no choice of technique. An 
equally important question is, do market value-maximizing firms 
make the "correct" decisions about the choice of technique; i.e., 
if a firm can reduce its own variance - but only at the expense of 
a reduction in its mean or an increase in its collinearity with the 
market - will it make the correct "trade-off" calculations? 
The results we obtain here very much parallel those obtained in 
the previous section: if all firms are independent, the economy oper- 
ates on its efficiency frontier; the only distortion arises from a dis- 
parity between the marginal rate of transformation between mean 
and standard deviation (the slope of the efficiency frontier) and the 
marginal rate of substitution (the slope of the indifference curve). 
On the other hand, if the firms are not perfectly independent, the 
economy will not even be on its mean variance frontier -too much 
weight will be placed on the own variance terms relative to the 
covariance terms. 
A. Independent Firms 
Because when firms are independent in the mean variance 
model, the market valuations depend only on the mean and vari- 
ance of output, we can completely describe the set of (relevant) 
technologies by the function 
(43) It-=Qfi (afx,, EXAM) 
For a fixed level of investment, we can decrease the variance by de- 
creasing the mean, while increasing the level of investment gives us 
3. That is, Pareto optimality requires 
1/2 
( , t ) g,2+2; 2 MiMj )S9sm > 
while (40) yields (using (22)) 
1/2 
-r= U)( {(9g9g+m'%Z m,)+(gig'+m m' )}. 
If gq',+mfm%/gfg%+m',2 mi is small, then the two equations are approxi- 
mately the same. 
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EX1i V E I 
/ , 




Choice of Technique: Independent Firms 
a higher mean and standard deviation. See Figure Va. A value- 
maximizing firm taking k and r as given chooses Ca and EX, so that' 
1 a~ 
r DEXj 
k 1 D0t 
r 2o-,,i Doi' 
i.e., 
(44) =E - 2ka,,. 
Efficiency requires 
min :f$a"2 
s. t. :NEXj+ he (I-:sg) = M, 




= qh'8 ,1-h' 
3Dxo DEXj 
from which it immediately follows that the competitive economy 
is efficient but not optimal. 
B. Nonindependent Returns 
When the firms are not independent the specification of the 
technology is only slightly more complicated. We assume for sim- 
4. To ensure that we have interior solution, all we require is that at fixed 
I, successive decreases in standard deviation can only be purchased by suc- 
cessively larger decreases in EX,. 
OPTIMALITY OF STOCK MARKET ALLOCATION 49 
plicity that there is only a single market factor common to all 
firms and that output in the different state of nature (for all Ij and 
production plans) can be described by an equation of the form (38). 
Then, we can describe the technology by 
(45) I, = f. (m, e, EX,) . 
Value maximization will result in 
(46a) a- /aEXi DV/DEXi 2kei 
andVE/i Z (i__ __ (46b) =0d/fm DV/Dmi =- 
aQi/'am Dv/ami 1 Y. mfj+ fi, 
Efficiency (i.e., to be along the mean variance frontier) requires 
(where K is a proportionality factor common to all i) 
(47a) 
Df2i/,E = 2K~j Da /DEXi 
(47b) Zafi/afj-= C 
ZDf2i/ZEmj Mj+mi 
ifj 
Comparing (46b) and (47b), we see again that the value-maximiz- 
ing firm puts too little weight on the covariance term ( X mi). The 
i7Aj 
two solutions are compared in Figure Yb. (It is likely to be increas- 
mi Ii Sli (Milei, EX;) 




Market choice of technique 




Choice of Technique: Own Variance versus Correlation with Market 
ingly difficult to provide outputs with lower and lower own variance, 
as well as increasingly difficult to provide outputs that are less and 
less correlated with the market. Hence, at constant 1i and EXj, e( 
is assumed to be a convex function of mi.) 
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An immediate corollary of these results is the following: if we 
confront the economy with a choice between two different projects 
costing the same amount, identical in mean, but differing in their own 
variances and covariances from other projects, the total market vari- 
ance will be independent of which firm undertakes the project; but if 
we confront different firms in the economy with the same choice, the 
decision made will in general differ from firm to firm. 
Even when the own variance terms are small relative to the 
covariance terms, the firm's "trade-off" between Ei and mi is twice 
what it should be. Of course, if ei is small for all i, the consequences 
of this may be negligible. In the limiting case where Ei O (the 
technology is of the form Ii= i(mi, EXj) ), the economy is "approx- 
imately" efficient and Pareto optimal if there are a large number of 
firms (mi is much less than X mj). 
i7j 
C. Discrete Choices 
These results are rather gratifying. They accord with our in- 
tuition: if the only "risk" a firm is "selling" is associated with a 
common market factor and if the individual firm is small relative 
to the market as a whole, we obtain the usual competitive results 
on Pareto optimality. When the firm is "selling" in addition some 
risk not associated with the market, it places too much emphasis on 
this. 
To obtain these results, we assumed that the firm faced a "con- 
tinuum" of techniques. In practice firms are likely to face a set of 
discrete choices, or, if there is a "continuum" of techniques, it is 
likely to be defined over a narrower range of values of (et, mi, EX1), 
so that corner solutions are more likely to occur. The emphasis on 
own variance may well result in the wrong (from the social point 
of view) decisions with respect to production plans (see Figure 
Vc). 
D. Structural Inefficiencies 
But still more striking is the result that, even if each firm takes 
the action that maximizes social welfare (taking the behavior of the 
other firms in the economy as given), the economy may not arrive 
at an optimal equilibrium. To see this, consider the following simple 
example. There are two industries. Each firm has available to itself 
two alternative investment projects, in the first industry A and B, 
in the second, C and D. There are a given number of firms and the 
level of investment in each firm has already been fixed. The sole 
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Technique B 
a constant value curve 
constant variance curve 
Technique A 
FIGURE VC 
Choice of Technique: Two Alternatives 
question facing each firm is whether, in the first industry, to use 
A or B, and in the second, to use C or D. The returns to all firms in 
the first industry, regardless of the technique they use, are indepen- 
dent, and similarly for the second. The mean returns to all projects 
are identical, and the own variances are identical. The projects 
differ then only in their covariances from projects of the other in- 
dustry. Let Cij be the covariance between the returns to the ith 
project of any firm in the first industry and the jth project of any 
firm in the second industry. We make the following assumptions 
about Cfj: 5 
(48a) CAC < CAD 




Assume that each firm, given the decisions of all the other 
firms, chooses the project (technique) that minimizes total social 
variance. (Alternatively, we may let it choose the project that maxi- 
mizes its value.) 
In this economy, then, there are two equilibria: In one, all 
of the firms in the first industry choose A, while all in the second 
choose C; while in the other equilibrium, all the firms in the first in- 
dustry choose B, while all in the second choose D. To see this, we 
observe that, because of our assumptions of independence within an 
5. It is easy to show that these assumptions are not inconsistent with the 
positive definiteness of the variance-covariance matrix. 
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industry, and identical means and own variances, the only thing that 
matters is the covariance with the projects undertaken by members 
of the other industry. If all the firms in the first industry choose A, 
all the firms in the second would choose C, since CAC<CAD. Con- 
versely, if all the firms in the second industry choose C, all the firms 
in the first would choose A, since CAC<CBC. Similarly, if all the 
firms in the first industry choose B, in the second they would choose 
D, since CBD <CAD; and if all the second choose D, all the first 
would choose B, since CAD> CBD-. 
But in the equilibrium (AC) everyone is better off than in the 
equilibrium (BD), since CAG < CBD- 
One might have thought that if firms merged, one firm from 
one industry merging with one firm of the other, the resulting co- 
ordination in choice of technique would ensure that the allocation 
(AC) would be adopted. But this is incorrect; for the important 
interactions are between a given firm in, say industry 1, and all 
the other firms in industry 2. What any single firm in industry 2 
does will not in general affect the choice of technique of the firms 
in industry 1. To ensure optimality, there must be coordination of 
choice of projects (techniques) over the entire economy: In the 
presence of uncertainty, but in the absence of a complete set of mar- 
kets for contingent claims (Arrow-Debreu) markets, we encounter 
important difficulties in efficient decentralization. 
This is an example of what might be called a structural ine- 
ciency in the economy. It cannot be corrected by marginal changes 
on the part of any single producer. 
V. REMARKS ON ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
Besides the Arrow-Debreu model, to which reference has been 
made in the introductory remarks, there is one other precisely for- 
mulated model of the stock market, that of Diamond.7 The central 
result of his study was that the allocation of investment was a (con- 
strained) Pareto optimal, in marked contrast to the results obtained 
here. One can perhaps best understand his model by way of an 
analogy to the automobile market. An automobile may be viewed 
as a composite commodity; 8 if there were enough different kinds of 
6. We have formulated the problem as if each could choose either one 
project or the other. But exactly analogous results obtain if the firm is allowed 
to choose- the proportions in which to invest in the two projects, although 
further restrictions in addition to (48) need to be imposed. 
7. Op. cit. 
8. As in K. J. Lancaster, "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," 
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automobiles one could infer the market valuation of tail fins, chrome, 
alternative sizes, vinyl seats, cloth seats, etc. But if the kind of 
automobile that a given producer is manufacturing has already been 
determined, these "constituent" prices are of no interest to him. His 
only concern is the price of the composite commodity that he pro- 
duces. If the producer should act like a price taker, then it is easy 
to see that the market equilibrium would be a "constrained" Pareto 
optimal, i.e., given the kinds of automobiles produced, the amounts 
produced are "correct." Diamond, following Modigliani and Miller, 
recognized that the same applies to risky assets. If the firm pro- 
duces only one pattern of returns across the states of nature, it 
needs to know only the "price" of a unit of that pattern of return. 
Indeed, we can completely eliminate any explicit mention of un- 
certainty on the part of either consumers or producers; consumers' 
expected utility is simply a function of the number of "units," Si, 
of each of the patterns of return they own-EU=c(S1, . . ., So) 
and firms' market valuation is simply a function of the number 
of units they supply: Vj= V(Sj). If firms act "competitively," i.e., 
take the price of a unit of the pattern of return as given, it is clear 
that the equilibrium will be a constrained Pareto optimal. 
The limitations of this model are clear: (a) it provides no an- 
swer to the fundamental question of the choice of technique; (b) it 
provides an answer to the question of the level of investment only 
under the stringent condition that the pattern of returns not change 
as the level of investment of the firm changes (multiplicative un- 
certainty) ; in fact, a change in scale of operation often entails a 
different production process with different patterns of return; (c) 
the behavioristic rule on which it is based is seriously open to ques- 
tion: is it reasonable to assume that when firms are not perfectly 
correlated they believe that doubling their scale will double their 
market value? Or is it -more reasonable to assume that they recog- 
nize what will in fact normally be the case, that the firm that is 
twice as large will have a value less than twice as great? 9 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 74 (April 1966), pp. 132-57, and Z. Griliches, 
"Hedonic Price Indexes Revisited: Some Notes on the State of the Art," 
Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, 1967, Business and Eco- 
nomics Statistics Section, pp. 324-32. 
9. A further difficulty, which V. Smith has emphasized to me, is that, ex- 
cept in the case of the mean variance model with homogeneous expectations 
analyzed here, the assumption of no bankruptcy will in general be violated 
by value-maximizing firms; the financial policy of the firm does make a 
difference; the models as presently formulated are then incomplete, since they 
do not explain the determination of the financial policy of the firm. 
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The Arrowv-Debreu model and the Diamond model are both at- 
tempts to analyze uncertainty by formulating a model that-is iden- 
tical in all essential respects to the conventional model without un- 
certainty. This, I suspect, gives us more insight into the limitations 
of the conventional model than into the actual workings of our 
economy. 
We have attempted to formulate a simple alternative model. 
The example that we have analyzed in detail has employed the 
familiar mean variance model; this is both a limitation and a 
strength of the model. For it is likely that it is in terms of some such 
simple parametrizations that firms make their decisions. The model 
has the further advantage that firms do act as price takers: they 
take as given the market rate of interest and the risk discount 
factor. Indeed, the "pricing" system that we have suggested firms 
use has all the properties of a normal pricing system; in particular, 
in equilibrium the values of all firms may be calculated in terms of 
the same valuation function (just as in the Arrow-Debreu model).-, 
It has the further property that in certain limiting cases, where there 
is no choice of technique and the own variances are negligible rela- 
tive to the covariances with the other firms in the economy, the 
market allocation is approximately Pareto optimal; in that case, 
firms can simply ignore that part of their own variance which is 
uncorrelated with the rest of the market. Both casual empiricism 
and econometric investigation suggest, however, that own variances 
are significant in explaining market valuations; 2 that firms are 
"risk averse" with respect to investment opportunities that are 
1. It is at this point that alternative "pricing" schemes that have some- 
times been suggested fail. For instance, it has been argued that firms perceive 
themselves as selling "mean" and "standard deviation." Thus, if the firm 
were to double its size, it would double its value; as a result, the market allo- 
cation will be Pareto optimal. But there is no "price" of standard deviation 
common to all firms that can correctly "predict" the value of the firm; e.g., 
in the case of independence, if the firm "priced" units of standard deviation 
at korq, it would correctly "explain" its market value, but this price will differ 
from firm to firm. A similar suggestion is that the firm perceives itself as sell- 
ing not standard deviation but "contributions to the total variance of market 
wealth." This fails for similar reasons, as explained at greater length in the 
Appendix. 
2. See, for instance, G. W. Douglas, "Risk in the Equity Markets: An 
Empirical Appraisal of Market Efficiency," Yale Economic Essays, vol. 9 
(Spring 1969), pp. 3-45, and J. Lintner, "Security Prices and Risk: The Theory 
and a Comparative Analysis of A.T. and T. and Leading Industrials," a 
paper presented at the conference on the Economics of Regulated Public 
Utilities, June 24, 1965 (as cited by Douglas). In fact, both of those studies 
suggest that firms ought to put even more weight on their own variance than 
they do in our model. See also M. H. Miller and M. Scholes, "Rates of Re- 
turn in Relation to Risk: A Reexamination of Some Recent Findings," mimeo, 
Chicago, 1970. 
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uncorrelated with the business cycle; 3 and that, although the mar- 
ket for the trading of securities is probably one'of the most competi- 
tive markets in existence, the firms do not act as perfect competitors 
in issuing securities: they are aware that (at least in the short run 
corresponding to the time scale of our model) increasing their size 
will increase their market valuation less than in proportion. It is 
these characteristics of the markets for risky assets that we have at- 
tempted to capture in our model. 
It seems clear that the result of the model, that the market 
economy will not be Pareto optimal,4 both because firms fail to take 
adequate account of covariances with other firms and because they 
perceive that their value will not increase in proportion to their 
scale in the short run, suggests that the stock market may not be as 
''efficient" a mechanism for allocating resources as has until now 
been thought to be the case and, in particular, as has been suggested 
by the previously formulated models of the stock market. Exten- 
sions of the model, allowing, for instance, for free entry of firms, rein- 
force the results reported here. In that case, not only will the total 
level of investment in the risky industries be too small, but also the 
number of firms will not be optimal. The economy will be operating 
below its mean variance frontier (allowing for a variable number of 
firms) even when the firms are independent. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
That a competitive economy would lead, as if by an invisible 
hand, to a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources has long been held 
to be one of its most attractive features. In the context of a static 
economy with no uncertainty, rigorous proofs of this result, as well 
as its converse, that every Pareto-optimal allocation can be sus- 
tained by a competitive equilibrium (with some redistribution of 
initial endowments), have been presented; and the limitations on 
the theorem, the importance of externalities, increasing returns to 
scale (nonconvexities), and public goods have been extensively dis- 
cussed. Arrow and Debreu have shown, moreover, how this model 
may formally be extended to include dynamic economies and un- 
certainty. But the markets required by this model are not present 
in any observed economy. Indeed, we have considered a case where 
3. If own variance terms were small relative to the correlation with the 
market, firms could simply ignore the own variance terms; they would be 
diversified out by the market. 
4. Except in the limiting cases already noted. 
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all individuals would purchase Arrow-Debreu securities in the same 
proportions, were they available. As far as consumers are con- 
cerned, they are perfectly content to have the securities provided 
by a single mutual fund. In such a situation, if there were even the 
slightest increase in costs of transacting in separate securities as 
opposed to mutual funds, it is likely that only a limited number 
of such markets would exist. Yet the prices that the Arrow- 
Debreu markets would provide for the guidance of firms in making 
decisions are essential for firms to make the correct allocative de- 
cisions. 
In analyzing the allocation of investment resources in an econ- 
omy with a stock market, we face two questions: 
1. Do the prices for the different capital goods (different securi- 
ties) correctly reflect the social returns from those goods (securities), 
or do the prices simply reflect, as Keynes suggested they did,5 our 
expectations of what others' expectations will be of the price of the 
good (security) in the future? Indeed, Hahn and Shell and Stiglitz 
have argued that, in the absence of a complete set of future markets, 
the competitive allocation among alternative capital assets might not 
(indeed, from their analysis, it appeared likely that it would not) be 
efficient.6 
2. Even if the prices for the different securities correctly reflect 
the social returns, will they lead to an efficient investment pattern? 
It is with this question that this paper has been primarily concerned. 
By limiting ourselves to a two-period model and by assuming for 
most of the analysis that all individuals are in agreement about the 
pattern of returns for each firm, we have been able to abstract from 
the first problem. Nonetheless, we have argued that the market's 
allocation of resources between safe and risky assets, the allocation 
among risky assets, and the choice of techniques will not be optimal. 
The results suggest that the "invisible hand" of competition 
may not work as well as had been previously thought. In some sense, 
these limitations on the optimality of competitive markets are far 
more serious than the restrictions that had been noticed earlier, for 
we are concerned here with one of the most fundamental of all eco- 
nomic activities, the allocation of resource among alternative invest- 
ment opportunities. Moreover, while externalities can be corrected 
5. J. M. Keynes, The General Theory (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
World, 1936). 
6. F. H. Hahn, "Equilibrium Dynamics with Heterogeneous Capital 
Goods," this Journal, vol. 80 (Nov. 1966), pp. 633-46; K. Shell and J. E. 
Stiglitz, op. cit. 
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by the appropriate use of tax policy, public goods will necessarily be 
provided by the government; and if there were only a few increasing 
returns to scale industries, they could be either nationalized or regu- 
lated by the government, while the rest of the economy remained 
under private control; the problem of the competitive misallocation 
among alternative investment opportunities does not appear to be so 
easily corrected. Some of the problems that we have raised for the 
competitive economy are equally problems for the decentralized 
socialist economy. Whether in fact any centralized decision-making 
mechanism would, in practice, give a better allocation remains a 
moot question. 
APPENDIX 
An alternative valuation function, proposed by Fama 7 among 
others, is that the firm values its contributions to expected market 
wealth and its contribution to the total variance of market wealth: 
1 EX KC ___ 
(A.1) -i _ =I 
where EX is the total average income (of all firms) and c$2 is total 
variance, and where K = U2/U1, the marginal rate of substitution be- 
tween mean and standard deviation. Firms are assumed to take r 
and K as given. Fama concludes his analysis by arguing, "The im- 
portant implication of all this is that in our two-parameter model, 
the shares of different firms are perfect substitutes, and no firm is 
unique in terms of the objects it brings to the capital market for 
sale," and "It is as if there were an (invisible) grand market over- 
seer who calls out the prices consumers and firms require to make 
optimal decisions." 
The one very special case in which those euphoric statements 
have some validity - that in which the technology has constant re- 
turns to scale (doubling investment doubles output in every state of 
nature)8 - is the case where this valuation function is equivalent 
to that employed by Diamond and by Modigliani and Miller. 
To see this, observe that if gq2 is the own variance per unit of 
investment, hi is the average return per unit of investment, and mi 
is the covariance with all other firms (per unit of investment), 
(A.2) Dax= (Ig,2+m )Mb, -EX =hi 
so that, rewriting (19), we obtain an equation of the form of (A.1) 
Vi-=Ih{ hi K- } /r 
7. E. Fama, "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium," U. of Chicago, mimeo. 1968. 
8. The analysis may easily be extended to the more general case of multi- 
plicative uncertainty. 
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where (with (22)) 
(A.3) K =kq -U2/U1. 
Assuming that K and 3ax/DIi are independent of the level of 
investment of the firm is equivalent to assuming that the value of 
the firm is proportional to investment. Thus the reason that this 
valuation function leads to Pareto optimality in this case has noth- 
ing to do with Fama's "two-parameter model," or the assumption 
that different securities are close substitutes for each other; rather it 
follows directly from the special nature of the technology and the 
price-taking behavior of firms, and is true without restriction as to 
the nature of the utility function. More generally, the value of the 
firm cannot be described by means of an equation of the form (A.1). 
(And if it can, there is no assurance that the resulting allocation 
will be optimal.) To see this, consider the following simple example. 
Assume that the jth firm's returns are independent of those of all 
other firms, and that 
EX* = hjh 
ei = = J 
Then 
as VIh2v-1g*2 3EXj_= 
DI - '(T 
and 
(hi-kg,2Ij2,-1) ___ ___a__ _ _ _ _ 
r r 
which is not of the form of (A.1) except if v= 1, i.e., the case of sto- 
chastic constant returns to scale. 
This rule encounters further difficulties: 
(i) It is not reasonable to assume a/DIh to be independent of 
Ih; consider the polar case where the firms all have independent dis- 
tributions and v= 1. 
No matter how large the number of firms, neither 'a a//aIj)/ 
DIj nor l 1(. /DI)/Dln.i are zero: 
_? (Dm/,ah) _9i2 ( MOIgi g,2 
if, as the number of firms gets large, the proportion of variance 
contributed by any single firm goes to zero; similarly 
D(l1n 3a_/Di) __2__2 
a -n Ija,2 
(ii) Moreover, how the firm is to evaluate its contribution to 
"risk,' except in the special case of stochastic constant returns to 
scale, is never specified. It is not an easily observed market param- 
eter.9 
9. A further disadvantage of the approach sketched above is that it is not 
possible to extend it to the case where individuals have a risky wage income 
with, say, mean EX.V and standard deviation awl,. Assume for simplicity that 






Opportunity Locus with Variable Wage Income 
all securities are independent of all wage incomes. It will no longer be true 
that the opportunity locus is a straight line; rather, it is a positively sloped 
concave function (depicted in Figure VI), as can easily be verified. This means 
that the marginal rate of substitution between mean and standard deviation 
will differ between different individuals; there is no single market trade-off 
between mean and standard deviation as in the earlier discussion. Nonetheless 
it can be shown that a valuation function of the form (19) remains valid. 
Much of the discussion of portfolio analysis has been conducted in terms 
of the mean and standard deviation of the rate of return. Since it is consump- 
tion in which the individual is ultimately interested, it seems more natural to 
evaluate alternative investment programs in terms of the wealth (consumption) 
that they provide at the end of the period. Nonetheless, it should perhaps 
be pointed out that, if individuals evaluated alternative income streams in 
terms of the mean and standard deviation of the rate of return, the market allo- 
cation would not be Pareto optimal even if there were stochastic constant re- 
turns to scale in the risky industry and it acted as a price taker. To see this, 
assume that the safe industry has a decreasing returns to scale production func- 
tion, and that there is a single risky industry that acted competitively. The 
social opportunity locus will then be a concave function, as depicted in Figure 
VII, with intercept with the vertical axis equal to h', (I). The individual takes 
the rate of interest as given, and hence faces a straight line opportunity locus. 
If the allocation to the safe industry is I, then the intercept with the vertical 
axis of the individual's opportunity locus is h', (Is)>h', (I) if L<I. Because of 
the assumption that there are stochastic constant returns to scale in the risky 
industry and that firms in the risky industry assume that the ratio of the 
value per unit of investment is independent of the level of investment, in 
competitive equilibrium the mean and standard deviations when investing in 
the risky asset alone are independent of the level of investment in the risky 
asset (and just equal to h and g, respectively). If all individuals were identical 
a competitive equilibrium would be a point such as C in Figure VII, where the 
slope of the private opportunity locus equals the marginal rate of substitution 
between mean and standard deviation at the intersection of the private and so- 
cial opportunity loci. But note that the optimal allocation again always lies at a 
higher level of investment in the risk industry than does the market allocation. 
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FiGuRE VII 
Competitive and Market Allocation of Investment 
with Individuals Maximizing Rate of Return 
In short, this alternative valuation function, in spite of its ap- 
peal to those who are convinced (on what basis it is hard to under- 
stand) of the optimality of the market allocation of investment in 
the presence of uncertainty, will not do; the only case where it is 
well defined and does "work" is the special case discussed in Sec- 
tion V where firms have no choice of technique and when the pat- 
tern of returns across the states of nature is unaffected by the scale 
of the firm. The limitations of this case have already been noted. 
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